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Abstract
In this paper, we describe a novel approach for checking safety speci-
fications of a dynamical system with exogenous inputs over infinite time
horizon that is guaranteed to terminate in finite time with a conclusive
answer. We introduce the notion of resolution completeness for analysis
of safety falsification algorithms and propose sampling-based resolution-
complete algorithms for safety falsification of linear time-invariant discrete
time systems over infinite time horizon. The algorithms are based on de-
terministic incremental search procedures, exploring the reachable set for
feasible counter examples to safety at increasing resolution levels of the
input. Given a target resolution of inputs, the algorithms are guaranteed
to terminate either with a reachable state that violates the safety specifi-
cation, or prove that no input exists at the given resolution that violates
the specification.
1 Introduction
1.1 Background
Simulation-based techniques for formally verifying properties (called specifica-
tions) of discrete, continuous and hybrid systems, have come under great deal
of attention recently. The motivation to use such techniques arises from the
fact that most of the real-world systems are quite complex and operate in the
presence of unknown external disturbances. As a result, verifying that each
and every state of a system satisfies a given specification may be impractical,
or in general even impossible. The problem of finding the set of all states the
system can reach (called as the reachable set), based on its dynamics and initial
conditions, is known as the reachability problem in literature. For continuous
and hybrid systems, this problem is in general known to be undecidable [1, 2].
An important class of specifications are safety specifications that describe the
properties that the state of a system should satisfy, to be considered safe. For
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Figure 1: Probabilistic vs resolution completeness
analyzing safety specifications of a system, a wide variety of methods have been
proposed in [3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11].
Most of these methods attempt to verify safety of a given system by over
approximating the actual reachable set. Hence, they are liable to generate a
spurious counter example which violates a specification, but is not a feasible
trajectory [12]. Even though refining the abstraction is usually possible, there
is in general no guarantee that the process of successive refinements would stop
in finite time [12]. As a result, such methods can only verify safety of a system
but will be inconclusive with regard to disproving it. Safety of a given system
can be disproved only by working with either the actual reachable set, or, by
giving a feasible counter example (constructed, e.g., using a simulation-based
method).
1.2 Sampling-based algorithms for safety falsification
To answer the complementary question of safety falsification, sampling-based in-
cremental search algorithms have been proposed by us, and others, in [13, 14, 15,
16], that are based on similar algorithms used in robotics [17]. These algorithms
try to falsify safety of the system quickly, but they are only probabilistically-
complete (see [17]). This means that, the algorithms will find a counter example
(if one exists) with probability 1, if they are allowed to run forever. However,
if they are terminated before a counter example is found, then they become
inconclusive.One such instance is shown in Fig. 1, at the left. The trajectories
are generated using Rapidly Exploring Random Tree [17], a probabilistically-
complete algorithm, for a point mass moving with bounded velocity in two
dimensions starting from a set containing origin. Terminating the search pro-
cedure before the unsafe set is reached leads to the wrong conclusion that the
system is safe. Note that the samples are points (zero volume sets) and the
sampling procedure is randomized.
To analyze the completeness properties of search based motion planning algo-
rithms used in robotics, the notion of resolution completeness has been proposed
in [18, 19]. A resolution-complete algorithm, is guaranteed to find a solution
(if one exists), in finite time, provided that, the resolution of discretization in
input space, and state space, is high enough. In [20, 21], we introduced a similar
notion for disproving safety of continuous and hybrid systems over infinite time
horizon, and, proposed resolution-complete deterministic algorithms applicable
to linear time invariant systems (abbreviated as LTI systems). The algorithms
work by incrementally building trajectories in state space at increasing levels
of resolution, such that, either they fetch a legitimate counter example, or a
guarantee that no such counter example exists at given level of resolution (and
hence a conclusive answer to the unsafety problem), in finite time. In Fig. 1, at
the right, we show an example where we end up with a non-zero volume under-
approximation to reachable set (when no counter example was found), when
using a sampling-based resolution-complete algorithm for safety falsification of
a second order system with exogenous inputs [20].Very recently, an alternate
notion of resolution completeness has also been proposed by Cheng and Kumar
for continuous-time systems for the case of finite horizon in [22].
1.3 Contributions of the paper and relation to other ap-
proaches
In this paper, we propose two new resolution-complete algorithms that use in-
cremental grid-based sampling methods (similar to those proposed in [23]) with
good coverage properties for exploring the state space. The first algorithm uses
breadth-first-search based scheme with branch and bound strategy to explore
the state space for counter examples to given safety specification, at increasing
levels of resolution of the input. This algorithm can be applied to discrete-
time LTI hybrid systems. Simulation results indicate that this algorithm, is an
improvement over the one proposed by us in [21] which is based on depth-first-
search based scheme with branch and bound strategy. The second algorithm
proposed in this paper can be used to falsify safety of discrete-time LTI con-
tinuous systems more efficiently, when the initial set is the equilibrium point.
The reachable set for such initial conditions is a convex set. The proposed algo-
rithm uses this fact to explore the state space more efficiently. Since both the
algorithms are resolution-complete, they consider the safety falsification prob-
lem over infinite time horizon, with guarantees of finite-time termination of the
search procedure and a conclusive answer at termination.
An important feature that distinguishes our approach from alternate ap-
proaches recently proposed by others (e.g. [24]) for addressing safety over infi-
nite time horizon, is that the requirements on discretization of state space in our
case do not depend on time length of trajectories. This is an important advan-
tage by itself, and also helps the algorithms in avoiding the so called wrapping
effect [25]. This means that, in case no counter example is found, then the
quality of the approximation constructed as a proof for safety of the system is
not affected by time horizon. We also do not discretize the space of inputs to
obtain completeness guarantees (unlike the approaches presented in [22, 24]).
The paper is organized as follows. We introduce the framework for describing
hybrid systems and reachable sets in Section 2 together with a formal definition
of the notion of resolution completeness for safety falsification. In Section 3, we
explain the main idea used in the proposed algorithms for resolution complete-
ness. Conditions for resolution completeness of the proposed algorithms are
discussed in Section 4. In Section 5, we explain the sampling method used by
us in the algorithms and in Section 6, we present the algorithms, together with
the proof of their completeness. Simulation results are discussed in Section 7,
and the paper is concluded in Section 8.
2 Preliminaries
In this section, we introduce notation for describing hybrid systems and reach-
able sets and define the notion of resolution completeness.
Definition 1 (Hybrid System). We define a discrete-time LTI hybrid system
H as a tuple, H = (Q,X ,U , U,Φ,∆, I,S, T ), where:
• Q is the discrete state space.
• X ⊆ Rn is the continuous state space.
• U is the family of allowed control functions equipped with a well defined
metric. Each control function u ∈ U is a function u : [0, tf ] → U , where
tf ∈ N is the terminal time of the trajectory. The convex set U ⊂ Rm is
the input space. For simplicity, we assume U to be a unit hypercube.
• Φ : Q×X ×U → X is a function describing the evolution of the system on
continuous space, governed by a difference equation of the form x(i+ 1) =
Φ(x, q, u) = Aqx(i) + Bqu(i), i ∈ N, and Aq, Bq are real matrices of size
n× n, n×m respectively.
• ∆ ⊂ (Q × X ) × (Q × X ), a relation describing discrete transitions in
the hybrid states. Discrete transitions can occur on location-specific sub-
sets G(q, q′) ⊆ X , called guards, and result in jump relations of the form
(q, x) 7→ (q′, x).
• I,S, T ⊆ Q × X are, respectively, the invariant set, the initial set, and
the unsafe set.
The semantics of our model are defined as follows. When the discrete state
is in location q, the continuous state evolves according to the difference equation
x(i + 1) = Aqx(i) + Bqu(i), i ∈ N, for some value of the input u(i) ∈ U , with
(q(0), x(0)) ∈ S. In addition, whenever x(i) ∈ G(q(i), q′), for some q′, the
system has the option to perform one of the discrete transitions modeled by
the relation ∆, and be instantaneously reset to the new discrete state q′, while
the continuous state remains the same as before the discrete transition. The
system is required to respect the invariants by staying within I at all times.
For the cases when the discrete state space is just a single location, we drop
the discrete state q from the notation. Ω = {q¯, q¯ : [0, tf ] → Q} denotes the set
of trajectories on the discrete space. Trajectories of the system starting from
z ∈ Q × X and using u ∈ U , under the discrete evolution q¯, are denoted by
Ψ(z, u, q¯) ⊂ Q×X . A point on the trajectory Ψ(z, u, q¯), reached at time i ≤ tf ,
is denoted by ψ(z, u, q¯, i) ∈ Q × X . We will denote by A◦ the interior of a set
A.
Definition 2 (Reachable Set). The reachable set R(U) for a system H denotes
the set of states that can be reached in the future. It is defined as
R(U) =
⋃
z∈S, u∈U, q¯∈Ω
Ψ(z, u, q¯).
We now formalize the notion of resolution completeness of an algorithm for
safety falsification of a discrete-time LTI system with exogenous inputs. 1
Definition 3 (Resolution completeness). A given algorithm is resolution-complete
for safety falsification of a system H, if there exists a sequence of family of con-
trol functions, {Uj}∞j=1, satisfying Uj ⊂ Uj+1,∀j, and limj→∞ Uj = U (in the
sense of a given metric), such that, for any given j ≥ 1, the algorithm termi-
nates in finite time, producing, either a counter example ψ(z0, u, q¯, t), using a
control function u ∈ U , z0 ∈ S, q¯ ∈ Ω, t ≥ 0, satisfying, ψ(z0, u, q¯, t) ∈ T , or a
guarantee that, R◦(Uj) ∩ T = ∅.
3 Basic Idea
One way to achieve completeness is to construct an approximation Rj (while
searching for a counter example) that satisfies the set inclusion R◦(Uj) ⊆ Rj ⊆
R(U) (shown in Fig. 3(a)), thus guaranteeing feasibility of counter examples and
safety with respect to control functions belonging to Uj . The algorithms that we
propose in this paper use this idea. To construct Rj , the algorithms discretize
the state-space using multi-resolution grids. For a discrete location q ∈ Q,
G(q) denotes the multi-resolution grid for location q that over-approximates
R ∩ I(q, ·). The algorithms keep a record of the portion of G(q) that is found
to be reachable (denoted as Gf (q)), either a priori or during an execution of
the algorithm. Gu(q) denotes the rest of G(q), i.e. Gu(q) = G(q) \Gf (q). The
algorithms progressively sample regions of Gu(q) (called cells) at increasing
levels of resolution and try to construct trajectories that end in the sampled cell
starting from somewhere in Gf (q). The conditions for state-space discretization
derived in Section 4 guarantee that finding one feasible point ψ(z0, u, q¯, t) in a
cell ξ(εj(q)) of size εj(q), with z0 ∈ Gf (q), u ∈ Uj , q¯ ∈ Ω, is enough to claim
that ξ ⊂ R(U). In Fig. 2, we show an execution of such a resolution-complete
safety falsification algorithm (starting at resolution j and stopping at j + 1) for
the case when cardQ = 1.
We would like to remark here that, if we can find conditions that ensure
the set inclusion, R◦(Uj) ⊆ Rj ⊆ R(U) for nonlinear systems, then similar
algorithms can be used for resolution complete safety falsification of non linear
systems as well.
1For a similar notion applicable to more general class of systems, we refer the reader to [21].
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Figure 2: Execution of a resolution-complete algorithm for card (Q) = 1
4 Conditions for Resolution-Complete Safety Fal-
sification
In this section, we derive necessary conditions for resolution-complete safety
falsification of discrete-time LTI hybrid systems. For all the discussion that
follows, ‖·‖ denotes the infinity norm. The set of control functions is, U =
{u(·) : ‖u(i)‖ ≤ 1, ∀i ∈ N, i ≤ tf}. Cq = [Bq AqBq . . . An−1q Bq] denotes the
controllability matrix of the system in location q ∈ Q.
4.1 Control functions for resolution completeness
For resolution completeness2, we need a sequence of control functions {Uj}∞j=1
such that Uj ⊂ Uj+1,∀j ∈ N and limj→∞ Uj = U in some metric defined on
the space of control functions. We consider sequence of families of piece-wise
constant control functions for our algorithm.
Proposition 1. For given family of control functions U , the sequence of family
of control functions {Uj}∞j=1, Uj = {u(·) : ‖u(i)‖ ≤ lj , ∀i ∈ N, i ≤ tf , tf ∈ N},
with {lj} a strictly non decreasing sequence of real numbers and limj→∞ lj = 1
satisfies Uj ⊂ Uj+1,∀j and limj→∞ Uj = U in L∞ norm.
Proof. The proposition is proved by stated requirements on {lj}. 
4.2 Assumptions
Assumption 1. For each discrete location q ∈ Q, the system H is stable at the
origin, rank (Bq) = m, and, rank (Cq) = n.
Stability (along with Assumption 2) guarantees thatG(q) has a finite volume.
rank (Bq) = m and rank (Cq) = n is needed to be able to use Propositions 2, 3.
Assumption 2. For each discrete location q ∈ Q, S(q, ·),G(q, ·) are specified
as convex polytopes and I(q, ·), T (q, ·) are specified as a convex polyhedra.
2Resolution is defined on the space of control functions, U .
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Figure 3: Set inclusions for resolution completeness
At each step, the algorithms incrementally build the trajectories and check
for unsafety and discrete mode switches by solving linear programs. Hence we
need the sets S(q·), I(q, ·),G(q, ·), T (q, ·) to be convex polyhedra. Boundedness
of S(q, ·),G(q, ·) is used to prove finite time termination of the algorithms.
We now consider continuous dynamics in a given discrete location q ∈ Q,
and derive sufficient conditions for discretization of cells in G(q).
4.3 Sufficient conditions for state space discretization
We first state an important proposition that guarantees that the set of points
ψ(z, u, q¯, k), that can be searched by the algorithms for feasibility, starting from
z, with u ∈ Uj (as in Proposition 1) in k ∈ N steps has a non zero volume. This
follows from the assumption that rank (Bq) = m, and, rank (Cq) = n in each
discrete location q ∈ Q.
Proposition 2. For a given system H satisfying Assumption 1, and for a given
location q ∈ Q, the set of points reachable by using a control function u ∈ Uj
(as in Proposition 1) over k steps has a non empty interior if dn/me ≤ k ≤ n
for any j ≥ 1, where n is the dimension of the continuous state space and m is
the dimension of input space.
Proof. Let k be chosen such that dn/me ≤ k ≤ n. The continuous dynamics
of the system are x(i + 1) = Aqx(i) + Bqu, where u ∈ Uj . Applying this over
k steps, we get x(k + i) = Akqx(i) + [Bq AqBq . . . A
k−1
q Bq]u˜, where u˜ ∈ Rkm is
the augmented input over k steps. Let v = [Bq AqBq . . . Ak−1q Bq]u˜. Then the
dynamics can be written as x(k+ i) = Akqx(i) + v, v ∈ Rn. Since rank (Cq) = n,
rank [Bq AqBq . . . Ak−1q Bq] = n. Hence the set of points reachable in k steps is
guaranteed to have a non empty interior. 
We now derive a conservative upper bound on the discretization of G(q), so
that for a cell ξ, if ξ∩R◦(Uj)∩I(q, ·) 6= ∅ then ξ ⊂ R(U)∩I(q, ·). To do so, we
first prove the result for a simpler case in Lemma 1, and then prove the main
result in Propositon 3.
Lemma 1. Consider a continuous system H, with x(i + 1) = Ax(i) + v with,
x, v ∈ Rn. For a given x1, and an α1 > 0, with x1 = Ax0 + v1, x0, v1 ∈
Rn, and, ‖v1‖ ≤ α1, the following holds true: For any x2 ∈ Rn, and a given
α2 > α1, if ‖x1 − x2‖ ≤ ε, and ε ≤ α2 − α1, then ∃v2 ∈ Rn, such that,
x2 = Ax0 + v2, with, ‖v2‖ ≤ α2.
Proof. Please refer to Fig. 3(b). v2 = v1 + x2 − x1 proves the result. 
Proposition 3. Consider a system H satisfying Assumption 1, with sequence
of families of control functions {Uj}∞j=1, as in Proposition 2. Let j ∈ N and
q ∈ Q be fixed. Then, if the cell size εj(q) for a cell ξ ∈ G(q) satisfies the bound,
εj(q) ≤ (1− lj)/‖Γ+q ‖, where Γq = [Bq AqBq . . . Ak−1q Bq] and Γq+ is the pseudo
inverse, then ξ ∩R◦(Uj) ∩ I(q, ·) 6= ∅ ⇒ ξ ⊂ R(U) ∩ I(q, ·).
Proof. The dynamics of the system over k steps can be written as x(k + i) =
Akqx(i) + v, with v = Γqu˜. Γq = [Bq AqBq . . . A
k−1
q Bq] and u˜ ∈ Rkm, ‖u˜‖ ≤ l
is the augmented input over k steps. This implies that u˜ = Γ+q v, where Γ
+
q is
the pseudo inverse of Γq. Finding the tightest bounds on v is hard. However
a conservative bound on v is ‖v‖ ≤ l/Γ+. Now, let v1 = Γqu˜1 and v2 = Γqu˜2
with u˜1, u˜2 ∈ Rkm and ‖u˜1‖ ≤ lj and ‖u˜2‖ ≤ 1. Let R(z, k) denote set of points
reachable by the system by using u ∈ U with tf = k, and R◦j (z, k) the interior
of the set of points reachable by the system by using u′ ∈ Uj with tf = k, under
continuous evolution, starting from z. This is shown in Fig. 3(c). The result of
Lemma 1 implies that for εq ≤ (1 − lj)/Γ+q , ξ ∩ R◦j (z, k) 6= ∅ ⇒ ξ ⊂ R(z, k).
This proves that ξ ∩R◦(Uj) ∩ I(q, ·) 6= ∅ ⇒ ξ ⊂ R(U) ∩ I(q, ·). 
5 Incremental Grid Sampling Methods
As we discussed in Section 3, for each location q ∈ Q, we use a multi-resolution
grid. Assume for this section that, card (Q) = 1, and that, G is a n-dimensional
unit cube, whose origin is the origin of coordinate axis. Using an iteratively
refined multi-resolution grid ensures that for a given j, Gu with resolution εj
does not have to be built from scratch. For our work, we will use multi resolution
classical grids. A multi-resolution classical grid at resolution level r has 2rn
points. Moreover, it contains all the points of all the resolution levels r′ < r.
Every grid point Pi, in a multi resolution classical grid at resolution level r, can
be written as Pi = {a12r , . . . , an2r } with 0 ≤ a1, . . . , an ≤ 2r − 1, a1, . . . , an ∈ N,
with the corresponding grid region (that we call as cells) ξ(r, i) = [a1,a1+12r ) ×
. . . [an,an+12r ). Here i is the unique identifier for each cell ξ, and it denotes its
order in the generated samples. For any resolution level j, the resolution level
j + 1 satisfies εj+1 = εj/2. For any two cells ξ1, ξ2, at resolution levels r1, r2
respectively, with r1 < r2, and, ξ1 ∩ ξ2 6= ∅, ξ1 will be called as the parent of ξ2
at resolution r1, and, ξ2 as a child of ξ1 at resolution r2.
Ideally, one would like to use an ordering of samples that minimizes the
discrepancy to find a counter-example as soon as possible. But discrepancy-
optimal orderings take exponential time to compute, and exponential space to
be stored (in n; see [23]). For our work, we use orderings that maximize the
mutual distance between sampled grid points (see [23]). The mutual distance
of a set K is defined as ρm(K) = minx,y∈K ρ(x, y). These orderings can be
represented by using generator matrices, that are binary matrices of size n× n
and represent bijective linear transformation over Z2. Any sample with identifier
i, at resolution j, can be generated by using the ordering recursively on the bit
representation of i. This method can also be used to bias the search towards the
unsafe set T , by possibly changing the generator matrix. In Fig. 4, we show the
samples for few resolution levels in 2 dimensions. As can be seen, cells whose
identifiers are close to each other (e.g. Resolution = 2 or 3, i = 0, 1) are spaced
quite far apart. This is in sharp contrast to the ordering that one would get by
using a naive sampling scheme, like scanning for example.
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Figure 4: Ordering of samples based on mutual distance
6 Algorithms for Resolution-Complete Safety Fal-
sification
In this section, we first explain the procedure for incremental construction of
trajectories used by the algorithms. We then present the algorithms, and in
Section 6.4, prove their resolution completeness.
6.1 Incremental construction of trajectories
As stated in Section 4.1, the algorithms use piece-wise constant control func-
tions satisfying Proposition 2. As discussed in the proofs of Propositions 2, 3,
for a given discrete state q ∈ Q, the dynamics can be simulated by using
x(k) = Akqx0 + v, where x0 ∈ I(q, ·), and, the set of feasible inputs is given
by v = Γqu˜, u˜ ∈ Rkm, ‖u˜‖ ≤ l˜j(q) = 1 − εj(q)‖Γq+‖. Note, that to be less
conservative, we are making the input bound l˜j(q) dependent on q ∈ Q and the
discretization εj(q). Hence, the algorithms use the input bounds based on the
space discretization and dynamics to incrementally build trajectories k steps
at a time, by formulating the k-step reachability problem as a linear program.
To solve these linear programs more efficiently, we use ideas from [26] for multi
parametric linear programming.
We use the following additional notation in the remaining of this section.
G = ∪q∈QG(q) denotes the union of all location specific grids in the algorithm.
j0 represents the smallest j, such that l˜j0(q) = 1 − εj0(q)‖Γq+‖ > 0,∀q ∈ Q.
For all j > j0, and, ∀q ∈ Q, l˜j(q) = 1 − εj(q)‖Γq+‖. εj is a Q-dimensional
vector with each element denoting value for a given location q. Since l˜j(q) can
be different for each discrete location q ∈ Q, at termination of the algorithms,
completeness will be guaranteed with respect to lj = minq∈Q l˜j(q).
6.2 Breadth First Search with Branch and Bound
The proposed algorithm is shown in Fig. 6. We will refer to this algorithm as the
BFS-BB Safety Falsification algorithm. A few iterations of the algorithm
for a first order discrete-time LTI system with single discrete mode, are shown
in Fig. 5 for a maximum resolution level of j = 3. Cells marked in yellow are
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Figure 5: An execution of BFS-BB Safety Falsification algorithm
the ones that need to be explored further based on branch and bound strategy.
Cells marked in red are conclusively not reachable from ξf (where ξf ∈ Gf is S
at the left and ξ(r = 2, i = 0) at the right). Cells marked in blue are the ones
that are found to be reachable.
BFS-BB Safety Falsification (H, jmax, G)
1 {locations,Found} ← {∅, ∅}
2 {j0, Gf , locations} ← init(H.S) //Initialization step
3 j ← j0
4 while (j ≤ jmax ∧ ¬Found) do
5 for all (q ∈ locations) do
6 update explorer(q,j) //Update simulation parameters for current j, q
7 for all (ξf ∈ Gf (q) ∧ ¬Found) do
8 for all (r ∈ {1, 2, . . . , j}) do
9 for all (i ∈ {0, . . . , 2rn − 1}) do
10 if (Found) then
11 return (Gf ,Found, εj) //Terminate if unsafe
12 ξt ←generate sample(i, r, q) //Sample generation
13 if (check feasible(ξt)) then
14 success ← expand(ξf , ξt) //Expansion step
15 if (success) then
16 add node(ξf , ξt) //Update of Gf (q)
17 Found ← check unsafety(ξt) //Check for unsafety
18 ξf .attempted ← true //Mark as attempted
19 locations.erase(q)
20 j + 1← G.refine(j) //Refinement step
21 return (Gf ,Found, εj)
Figure 6: BFS-BB Safety Falsification algorithm
Data structure: Each cell ξ has its identifier i, resolution level r, and
boolean variables attempted ,filled . attempted is true, if, ξ ∈ Gf (q) has been
attempted for expansion (and the cell is called attempted). The variable filled
is true (and the cell is called as filled) if, the cell ξ has size j(q) (for some j)
and is found to be reachable using l˜j(q), or, all its children at resolution j + 1
are filled. Gf is implemented as a hash map to enable quick look up for existing
cells in Gf .
Initialization step: In the first step, the algorithm computes the first
feasible resolution level j0 and initializes Gf (q) ∀q ∈ Q. Next all q ∈ Q are
added to locations for which Gf 6= ∅. This happens in init(H.S) function in
the algorithm.
Exploration step: The grid is searched for reachable cells with current
bounds on input in a recursive Breadth-First-Search (BFS) fashion along with
Branch and Bound (BB) strategy in the algorithm for each location q ∈ locations
(after updating the simulation parameters used by the algorithm for location
q in update explorer(q, j) function in the algorithm). First, a filled cell ξf
is chosen in Gf (q). Next, for all depths r ∈ {1, . . . , j} samples ξt are gener-
ated in generate sample(i, r, q) function (after checking if Found = ∅). The
function check feasible(ξt) checks feasibility of ξt based on branch and bound
condition from coarse resolution levels, and the fact that its parent might have
been marked as filled already at some coarser resolution level r′ < r. The
expand(ξf , ξt) function attempts to solve the k-step reachability problem as
discussed in Section 6.1. If it is successful then the add(ξf , ξt) function adds ξf
to Gf (q).
Unsafety check: Each newly added cell ξt in add(ξf , ξt) step is checked for
intersection with the unsafe set T , if, it is filled, in check unsafety(ξt) function.
Discrete transition step: For a given location q, each cell ξ ∈ G(q) that
is found to be reachable from Gf (q) is checked for all the outgoing discrete
transitions from q. If a guard G(q, q′) is found to be enabled, then G(q, q′) ∩ ξ
is added as a filled cell to Gf (q′) using the function add(ξ,G(q, q′)∩ ξ) and q′ is
added to locations. This happens internally in add(ξf , ξt) function.
Refinement step: When all the cells ξf ∈ Gf (q) have been explored for
expansion ∀q ∈ Q, and locations = ∅, then the grid resolution is changed using
the relation εj+1(q) =εj(q)/2, and the input bounds are changed from l˜j(q) to
l˜j+1(q). For all the cells ξ ∈ Gf (q), and, ∀q ∈ Q, the variable attempted is reset
to false. This happens in the G.refine(j) function in the algorithm.
Termination criteria: To have a finite termination time, the refinement
procedure is allowed only till j ≤ jmax, and, no counter example has been found.
6.3 Resolution-complete Co-RRT
In this section, we discuss a modified version of the Co-RRT algorithm proposed
by us in [13] for continuous systems that is resolution-complete. This algorithm
can be used for analyzing safety of a continuous system when it starts from
equilibrium under the effect of exogenous inputs. We first state an important
lemma regarding reachability of points that are convex combinations of two
reachable points.
Proposition 4. For an origin-stable, continuous system H, if S = {0}, then for
any two reachable points ψ1(0, u1, k1), ψ2(0, u2, k2), u1, u2 ∈ U , k1, k2 ∈ N, k2 ≥
k1, the convex combination ψλ = λψ1 + (1− λ)ψ2, λ ∈ [0, 1] is also reachable in
k2 time steps.
Proof. ψ1(0, u1, k1) = [BAB . . . Ak1−1B]u1, ψ2(0, u1, k2) = [BAB . . . Ak2−1B]u2.
u1, u2 ∈ Rk1m,Rk2m respectively. Let B˜k = [BAB . . . Ak−1B], and, θc ∈ Rc, de-
note the zero vector. This implies that ψλ = λB˜k2 [u
′
1θ
′
m(k2−k1)]
′+(1−λ)B˜k2u2.
Since U is convex, uλ = λ[u′1θ
′
m(k2−k1)]
′ + (1− λ), u2 ∈ U . 
Corollary 1. R(U) is a convex set for a system H (as in Proposition 4).
The proposed algorithm, called as the Co-RC Safety Falsification al-
gorithm, is shown in Fig. 8. In Fig. 7, we show a few iterations of the algorithm
for a second order system.
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Figure 7: An execution of Co-RC Safety Falsification algorithm
Data structure: The data structure is the same as one in previous algo-
rithm except that Gf now contains a special node Gf .Hull that contains the
information about the convex hull and which is used for actual expansion step,
and unsafety checks.
Initialization step: In the first step, the algorithm computes the j0, and,
Gf .Hull is initialized to S. This is done in init(H.S) function in the algorithm.
Exploration step: The sample generation and search strategy are similar
to previous algorithm. The function check feasible(ξt) checks feasibility of ξt
based on the fact that ξt may be contained inside Gf .Hull, i.e, ξt ⊂ Gf .Hull,
or, its parent may not be reachable with the current Gf . In such a case,
the function check feasible(ξt) returns false. If it returns true, then the
expand(Gf .Hull, ξt) function attempts to solve the k-step reachability problem
as discussed in Section 6.1. If it is successful, then the Co(Gf .Hull, ξt) func-
tion updates Gf .Hull in the function Co(Gf .Hull, ξf ). The operator Co updates
Gf .Hull to the convex combination of Gf .Hull and vertices of the cell ξt.
Unsafety check: Each time a new cell is added to Gf , intersection of
Gf .Hull and T is checked in the function check unsafety(Gf .Hull).
Co-RC Safety Falsification (H, jmax, G)
1 Found ← ∅
2 {j0, Gf .Hull} ← G.init(H.S) //Initialization step
3 j ← j0,change ← false
4 while (j ≤ jmax ∧ ¬Found) do
5 update explorer(j) //Update the simulation parameters for current j
6 repeat
7 change ← false
8 for all (r ∈ {1, . . . , j}) do
9 for all (i ∈ {0, . . . , 2rn − 1}) do
10 if (Found) then
11 return (Gf ,Found, εj) //Terminate if unsafe
12 ξt ←generate sample(i, r) //Sample generation
13 if (check feasible(ξt)) then
14 success ← expand(Gf .Hull, ξt) //Expansion step
15 if (success) then
16 change ← true
17 Gf .Hull← Co(Gf .Hull, ξt) //Update the Hull
18 Found ← check unsafety(Gf .Hull) // Unsafety check
19 until (¬change)
20 j + 1← G.refine(j) //Refinement step
21 return (Gf ,Found, εj)
Figure 8: Co-RC Safety Falsification algorithm
Refinement step: When all the cells at a given resolution level j have
been explored (possibly repeatedly) for reachability from Gf .Hull and no new
cell can be reached, the grid resolution is increased according to the relation
εj+1 = max(εj/2, εmin), and the input bounds are changed from lj to lj+1.This
happens in the G.refine(j) function in the algorithm.
Termination criteria: To have a finite termination time, the refinement
procedure is allowed only till j ≤ jmax, and, no counter example has been found.
We next discuss the resolution completeness of the proposed algorithms.
6.4 Resolution completeness
We first prove two important lemmas required to prove the main result in The-
orem 1. The first lemma proves that for a given maximum resolution level
j ≥ j03, the algorithms terminate in finite time, and the second lemma proves
the required set inclusion for resolution completeness.
Lemma 2. Consider a LTI discrete-time hybrid system H and a given jmax ≥
j0. Then the Safety Falsification algorithms terminate in finite time.
Proof. Consider the CoRC Safety Falsification algorithm first. The algo-
rithm starts with the value εj0 initially. If at any stage a counter example
is found, finite time termination is trivially guaranteed. Otherwise, note that
by Assumptions 1, 2, G is guaranteed to have a finite volume. Since there
is a given bound jmax on the resolution, it is guaranteed that the algorithm
will be able to refine the resolution only a finite number of times. The sum
of the number of cells over all the possible refinements of the grid G is given
by Ncells = 2
ndε0/εjmaxe−1
2n−1 . Hence in the worst case, the algorithm terminates
3For j < j0 the input bounds are infeasible by choice of ε0 as discussed in Section 6.1
within N2cells iterations. Now consider the BFS-BB Safety Falsification al-
gorithm. We have |Q| locations. For each location q, let Ncells(q) be the total
number of cells over all possible refinements. The number of guards can be
no more than |Q|2. Hence, in the worst case, the algorithm terminates within
|Q|2 maxq∈QN2cells(q) iterations.

Lemma 3. Consider a LTI discrete-time hybrid system H and a given jmax ≥
j0. Then the Safety Falsification algorithms find a feasible counter example or
else generate an approximation Rjmax such that R◦(Ujmax) ⊆ Rjmax ⊆ R(U).
Proof. For a given jmax, ljmax is fixed. The set inclusion Rjmax ⊆ R(U) follows
from the discussion in Section 3, and Proposition 2, 3. This guarantees feasibil-
ity of the counter examples found by the algorithms. For a location q ∈ Q, if a
point is found reachable by the algorithms in a cell ξ, then the algorithms mark
that cell as reachable based on the relaxation of input bounds from lj(q) to 1,
where j0 ≤ j ≤ jmax. As a result we are guaranteed that when the algorithms
terminate, the set inclusion R◦(Ujmax) ⊆ Rjmax also holds true. Taking convex
combinations of reachable cells in the CoRC Safety Falsification algorithm
does not violate this inclusion. 
Theorem 1. Consider a LTI discrete-time hybrid system H as in Lemmas 2, 3.
Then the Safety Falsification algorithms are resolution complete for the system
H.
Proof. Let jmax ≥ j0 be given. Proposition 1 guarantees the existence of re-
quired sequence of family of control functions. From Lemma 3 we know that if
a counter example is found it is feasible. If no counter example is found, then it
implies that there doesn’t exist one (using the class of control functions Ujmax),
from the set inclusion proved in Lemma 3. Moreover,, Lemma 2 guarantees that
the algorithms will terminate in a finite time. 
7 Simulation Results
In this section, we present the simulations results obtained on different discrete
time systems.The implementation has been carried out in C++ on a Pentium
4, 2.4 GHz machine, with 512 MB of RAM.We will examine the performance
of algorithms presented in Section 6.2 (called as BFS-BB), Section 6.3 (called
as CoRC) and the one presented in [21], which is based on Depth-First-Search
with Branch and Bound strategy (called as DFS-BB).
7.1 Safety falsification of a discrete-time fifth-order sys-
tem
The example presented in this section is mainly intended to investigate perfor-
mance of different algorithms for problems in moderate dimensions. We con-
sider a fifth-order system, with dynamics specified as: x(i+ 1) = Ax(i) +Bu(i),
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Figure 9: Performance comparison of different algorithms for fifth-order system
A = 0.6065 I, B = 3.935 I. The initial set is S = {0}. The simulation parame-
ters are as follows: ε0 = 27.2, jmax = 4. This corresponds to ‖u‖ ≤ 0.5679. The
unsafe set is a hypercube of size 0.90 and is given by T = x + [−0.45, 0.45]5.
We did 50 test runs each with an unsafe set randomly centered at x, where
x ∈ [−7, 7]5 was chosen using a uniform distribution.
The performance results using different algorithms are shown in Fig. 9. The
performance results indicate that when ever a counter example was found, all the
algorithms terminated within 5 minutes. The BFS-BB algorithm falsifies safety
sooner than other two algorithms. From the results, it is difficult to comment if
CoRC performs better than DFS-BB or not. We have also done some profiling
of the CoRC algorithm, and have found that almost 70% of the time is spent in
removing the redundant vertices of the hull in the Co(Gf .Hull, ξf ) function. In
our current implementation, we reconstruct the convex hull from scratch every
time the Co(Gf .Hull, ξf ) function is called. We are working on using software
libraries that support incremental construction of convex hulls.
7.2 Safety falsification of a discrete-time second-order hy-
brid system
We now consider a second-order hybrid system with two discrete states. The
example is interesting because of the fact that the guards and the invariants
are all the same, and hence there is a potential problem of cycles. The dy-
namics are specified as x(i + i) = Aqx(i) + Bqu(i), q ∈ {1, 2}, with, A1 =
[0.679 0.404;−0.674 0.140], B1 = [0.440;−0.213], A2 = [0.679 −0.404; 0.674 0.140],
B2 = [0.3486;−0.1628]. I(1, ·) = I(2, ·) = G(1, 2) = G(2, 1) = [−2, 2]2.
The initial set is S = 0 × [−0.1248, 0.1248]2. The simulation parameters are
ε0 = 4, jmax = 7. Corresponding to this ‖u‖ ≤ 0.792 for q = 0, and ‖u‖ ≤ 0.869
for q = 1. Hence, for the case when no counter example is found, completeness
will be guaranteed for ‖u‖ ≤ 0.792.
The simulations are run for two cases based on the size of the unsafe set.
In Case I, the unsafe set is small which makes it more difficult to be found
by the explorer. However, quite often the unsafe set is specified as a large set
(e.g. a half space representing the separation between two cars or aircrafts). To
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Figure 10: Safety falsification example and performance for Case I
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Figure 11: Safety falsification example and performance for Case II
evaluate the performance of the algorithm for such cases, we present test runs
in Case II. We did 200 runs for both the cases.
Case I: Small unsafe sets: For this case, the unsafe set is given by: T =
qr × {x + [−0.1, 0.1]2}, where x ∈ [−1.5, 1.5]2, was chosen using a uniform
distribution and qr ∈ {0, 1}.
Case II: Large unsafe sets: For this case, we chose the unsafe set as a
randomly oriented half space, given by: T = qr × {(x1, x2) : mx1 + ax2 ≤ c},
where, m ∈ [−3.73, 3.73], c ∈ [−1.9, 0],qr ∈ {0, 1}, and a = − sgn(c). c,m are
chosen from a uniform distribution such that S ∩ T = ∅.
Fig. 10 and Fig. 11 show performance results for the two cases along with
a run when a counter example was found. Both the DFS-BB and BFS-BB
algorithms falsify safety sooner for Case II.The BFS-BB falsifies safety in less
than 10 seconds for 68 cases, compared to 54 for DFS-BB in Case I, and 164
times compared to 149 times for Case II.
8 Conclusions
In this paper, we have presented sampling-based resolution-complete algorithms
for safety falsification of linear time invariant discrete-time systems over infinite
time horizon. The algorithms attempt to generate a legitimate counter example
by incrementally building feasible trajectories in the state space at increasing
levels of resolution or provides a guarantee in a finite time that no such example
exists, when the input is restricted to a certain class. As an additional result,
when no counter example is found, the algorithms provide us with an arbitrar-
ily good under approximation to the reachable set whose quality is independent
of length of trajectories. Efforts are currently underway to develop more ef-
ficient algorithmsthat combine the nice features of both the depth-first-search
and the breadth-first-search strategies to explore the state space.We are also
investigating if its possible to develop similar algorithms for nonlinear systems.
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